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Abstract:
High unemployment in many OECD countries is often attributed, at least in part, to the generosity
and long duration of unemployment compensation.  It is therefore instructive to examine a country
where high unemployment exists despite the near complete absence of an unemployment insurance
system.  In South Africa unemployment stood at 23% in 1997 and the unemployed have no
unemployment insurance nor informal sector activities to fall back on.  This paper examines how
the unemployed are able to get access to resources without support from unemployment
compensation.  Analysing a household survey from 1995, we find that the household formation
response of the unemployed is the critical way in which they assure access to resources.  In
particular, unemployment delays the setting up of an individual household of young people, in some
cases by decades.  It also leads to the dissolution of existing households and a return of constituent
members to parents and other relatives and friends.  Access to state transfers (in particular, non-
contributory old age pensions) increases the likelihood of attracting unemployed persons to a
household.  Some unemployed do not benefit from this safety net, and the presence of unemployed
members pulls many households supporting them into poverty.  We also show that the household
formation responses draw some unemployed away from employment opportunities and thus lowers
their employment prospects.  The paper discusses the implications of these findings for debates
about unemployment and social policy in South Africa and in OECD countries.
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21. Introduction
Rigid labour markets and generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits are often
claimed to be important factors causing high unemployment rates in continental Europe (e.g.
OECD, 1994; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999).  To take another approach to
examining these claims, this paper studies the experience of a country with high unemployment
rates despite a virtually complete absence of an unemployment compensation system.  This country
is South Africa which  is currently experiencing one of the highest reported unemployment rates in
the world.  Using a ‘narrow’ definition of unemployment (including only those who are willing to
work and actively searching), South Africa has an unemployment rate of 24% in 1999; using a
‘broad’ definition (including those who are willing to work but are not searching), the
unemployment rate stands at about 38% (see Table 1).1 These rates are at the very high end of
developing countries overall and worse than unemployment rates in all OECD countries (World
Bank, 1995: 28-29; OECD, 1997).  Moreover, high unemployment coexists with comparatively low
levels of labour force participation (around 55% of the working age population) with the result that
less than 40% of the working age population are actually working.  As documented in great detail
by Klasen and Woolard (1999), these high rates of open unemployment are not due to high levels of
informal sector or agricultural activities or to other issues of undercounting employment or
overstating unemployment.2
While urban unemployment rates are already very high, the even higher rural unemployment
rates (particularly in the former ‘homelands’) are striking as unemployment rates in rural areas of
developing countries tend to be much lower than in urban areas (Todaro, 1997; World Bank, 1995).3
There is also a large racial differential in unemployment with Africans suffering from a 29% strict
and 47% broad unemployment rate in 1997, compared to only 4.6% and 6.7% unemployment rates
among whites in 1997 (see Figure 1).4
These high unemployment rates constitute a puzzle in two respects.  First, how do the
unemployed sustain themselves in a country where only some 3% of the unemployed are receiving
                                                          
1 There is some discussion as to what is the appropriate unemployment rate to use for analyses of the labour market.
Kingdon (1999) argues that the ‘broad’ unemployment rate is the appropriate one, while others believe that the ‘narrow’
unemployment rate tracks the performance of the labour market more reliably.  For a discussion, see SSA 1996, Klasen
and Woolard  (1999, 2000). Including involuntary part-time employed would add another 2% to the unemployment rate.
2 While there have been some questions about the reliability of some of these figures (e.g. ILO, 1996; Schlemmer,
1996), the consistency between the unemployment rates measured in five consecutive household surveys and the general
consistency with employment statistics, labour force participation data, various methodologies to capture the informal
economy and to elicit information about the activities and means of support of the unemployed confirm these unusually
high unemployment rates.  See Klasen and Woolard (1999, 2000) for further details.
3 Those rates exceed, for example, the most careful accounting of unemployment and underemployment in rural areas in
India by a considerable margin (Bardhan, 1978, see also Fallon and Lucas, 1997).
4 Throughout the paper, we use the currently used descriptions of population groups in South Africa.  We refer to black
South Africans as Africans, people of mixed-race origin as Coloureds, people of Indian and other Asian origin as
3unemployment support at any one point in time?5  Second, while it may be the case that urban
unemployment rates are related to adverse macroeconomic shocks, the legacy of apartheid-era
distortions, and growing labour market rigidities (e.g. Fallon and Lucas, 1997), how can it be that
unemployment is so high in rural areas where there is no enforced labour regulation(Labour Market
Commission, 1996), and where wages could (presumably) freely adjust to equilibrate labour
demand and supply.
This paper investigates these questions and shows that the unemployed attach themselves to
households with adequate means of private or public support to ensure access to basic means of
survival.  These location decisions often lead the unemployed to stay in, or move to, rural areas
where the nature of economic support tends to be better which can thus partly account for the high
rural unemployment rates.  At the same time, they leave most of the unemployed and the households
supporting them mired in deep poverty, with some unemployed facing destitution.  In addition,
these coping strategies appear to negatively influence search and employment prospects as the
location of economic support is often far away from promising labour market opportunities.
Apart from the obvious relevance of the findings to South African unemployment and social
policy (see Klasen and Woolard, 1998), the findings of the paper are of relevance also to debates
about unemployment support and social policy in OECD countries (e.g. OECD, 1998; Murray,
1984; Ellwood and Bane, 1985, Moffitt, 1992; Atkinson and Mickleright, 1991; Gregg and
Wadsworth, 1996).  As a natural experiment of a country with only negligible access to
unemployment insurance, it sheds some light on the consequences of the lack of such a support
system on incentives and employment prospects of the unemployed as well as their welfare and the
welfare of those who support them.  Moreover, these findings may also contribute to debates about
Southern European patterns of unemployment, particularly among the young, where lack of public
support for the unemployed young also appears to lead to marked changes in the household
formation patterns of the unemployed (mainly a long delay in leaving the parental home and
deferred marriage and child-bearing) and appears to contribute to locational rigidities in the labour
market (Gallie and Paugham, 2000; Bentolila and Ichino, 2000).6
This paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the relevant literature on
unemployment and household formation, while section 3 provides some background to South
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Indians, and people of European descent as whites.
5 The Saldru survey finds that about 2.5% of households containing unemployed people are receiving unemployment
support (it does not attribute this income to a specific person within the household).  ILO (1996) suggests that about
600,000 (or about 12% of the unemployed) received some unemployment support over the course of the year 1992.  The
two figures can be reconciled, knowing that the maximum amount of time the UIF pays out is 26 weeks, and recognising
that the actual pay-out time is often much shorter (for workers with short unemployment spells or those who do not
qualify for the full 26 weeks due to an insufficient prior work history).
6 See also a recent article in the Economist about the high propensity of Italian males to live with (or very close to) their
4Africa and the data used.  Section 4 examines descriptive statistics, section 5 specifies a
multinominal logit model relating employment status to household formation, and section 6
investigates the consequences of these household formation decisions on incentives to search and on
the welfare of households hosting unemployed members.  Section 7 concludes with policy
implications for South Africa and OECD countries about the incentive and welfare effects of
various unemployment policies.
2. Unemployment and Household Formation: Literature and Framework
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the South African case, it may be useful to
briefly consider the existing literature on unemployment and household formation and present a
simple theoretical framework for the ensuing discussion.
Most empirical analyses of incentive effects associated with length and generosity of
unemployment benefits focus on the unemployed individual (e.g. Atkinson and Mickleright, 1992;
Mortenson, 1977; Steiner, 1997).  More recently, the impact of the household on unemployment has
been brought in in two ways.  First, household resources of other members of the household have
been included in analyses of incentive effects.  These studies found that the availability of other
household resources may also raise reservation wages and thus prolong search and unemployment
durations although the size of the effects is a matter of some debate (e.g. Atkinson and Mickleright,
1991; Arulampulam and Stewart, 1995).  Second, the distribution of unemployment across
households has recently received some attention in a literature examining employment and
unemployment polarisation and thus the welfare consequences of unemployment (e.g. Gregg and
Wadsworth, 1996; OECD, 1998).  While both literatures enrich the debates about unemployment,
they tend to treat the household as exogenous, although several studies mention the possibility that
household formation may be a result rather than a cause of labour market outcomes (OECD, 1998:
8; Bentolila and Ichino, 2000).         
At the same time, there exists a theoretical and econometric literature that examines the
determinants of household formation and transfers between households that can shed some light on
the questions examined here.  McElroy (1985) considers a Nash-bargaining model of family
behaviour that jointly determines work, consumption, and household membership, in particular the
decision whether a young male resides with the parents or on his own.  In this model, the location
decision of the youth (alone or with parents) as well as his labour supply decision are considered
jointly and she finds that parents insure their sons against poor labour market opportunities.  While
drawing from insights of these models, we deviate from this framework as we take the employment
                                                                                                                                                                                                
mothers (Economist, 2000).
5situation as exogenous and then consider the optimal residential decision as a result.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993, 1994) study the resource allocation of parents in the US
towards their children in the form of transfers and co-residence.  They also consider the impact of
own earnings of the children, public transfers and fertility decisions of their children on these
resource allocations.  They find that there is some limited trade-off between parental and
government aid to children and that unemployment significantly increases the chance of staying
with one’s parents or receiving a transfer.7  While using some insights from these models, we focus
on the location decision of the individual rather than his/her parents.  Moreover, we broaden the
analysis to consider not only parents but other relatives or even non-relatives as potential receiving
households, while we limit the analysis to residence decisions as inter-household transfers to
support an unemployed relative play a negligible role on the South African context.8
Finally, there is a literature on household formation that is particularly focused on the price
of housing.  Börsch-Supan (1986) finds that housing prices significantly influence the formation of
households.  Ermish and Di Salvo (1997) find that own income increases household formation,
parental income reduces it, and unemployment also serves to reduce household formation of young
people in Britain.9
Using insights from this literature, we consider the following framework for the empirical
analysis.  We take the labour market situation as given and consider the residential decision of the
individual.  In particular, we want to consider the decision of forming one’s own household versus
attaching oneself to the household of parents, relatives, or friends.  The individual is assumed to
maximise a utility function subject to a budget constraint that considers the incomes available to
that individual in the various possible household arrangements.  If living on one’s own, the
arguments in the utility function only include wages, non-wage incomes, and prices, while other
considerations are added when being attached to another household.  They include a privacy cost to
being attached to another household which presumably rises with age, education, and being married
(see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993, 1994), but include the additional benefit of getting access to a
                                                          
7Another literature closely related to the topic investigated here deals with the household formation and dissolution
decisions associated with welfare in the USA.  In this well-known debate, Murray (1984) and others charged that AFDC
was splitting up families by penalising two-parent families.  Ellwood and Bane (1985) and Ellwood and Summers
(1986) suggested instead that more generous welfare payments were having minimal effects on marriage, divorce or
birth rates, but their main effect is to allow single mothers with children to form their own households instead of forcing
them to live with their parents.  They suggest that in a world without welfare many single-mothers would be forced to
live with their parents, and many others would be extremely poor, while the incidence of single motherhood or
illegitimacy would be less affected.
8 Remittances do play a significant role in South Africa, but usually in the form of a working single individual remitting
funds to his/her family, but not a family sending resources to support an unemployed individual (see May 1996, May et
al. 1997).
9 In contrast, Richards et al.(1987) find that higher income of the parental household increases the likelihood of the
children living alone and the labour force data do not significantly influence the nature of transitions from household
6share of the incomes of the household to which one is attached.   In addition, one benefits from
sharing in the economies of scale of being in a larger household.  For example, we can simply
assume that the share each person can get access to is proportional to the scale-adjusted household
income per capita.10  A further cost to being attached to another household may however be that one
is thereby bound by the location of that household and may therefore face reduced labour market
opportunities if the household is in a region where there is little demand for the labour the
individual provides.
Thus the framework we are considering is the comparison between the indirect utility
functions of living on one’s own and being attached to another household:
V (alone)  =  f  (w, p, I)
   +  -  +
V(attached) = g (w, p, I, cp(age, education) δPr(w), Y/nθ)
   +   -   +      -          -                -           +     
where w is the wage rate (zero in the case of unemployment), p prices, I non-wage income, cp refers
to the privacy cost which is assumed to rise with age and education11, δPr(w) refers to the
discounted expected value of lost wages due to attaching oneself to a household where employment
prospects are scarce, Y/nθ is the scale-adjusted per capita income of the household one is attached to
(which can include market and public incomes).  Being employed and earning higher wages should
increase the likelihood of living on one’s own as it becomes relatively more attractive to avoid the
privacy costs, while the benefits to being attached to another household are comparatively smaller.12
Conversely, being unemployed should reduce the attractiveness of living alone as now the access to
income from other household members looms larger in the calculation of relative benefits.  Being
older and married should also reduce the likelihood of being attached, while the higher the (scale
adjusted) per capita income of the household one can go to should increase the likelihood of being
attached.  Finally, the costs of being attached to a household in a poor labour market should matter
less for unemployed people who already face poor labour market opportunities as their forgone
earnings are comparatively smaller.
This very simple framework should allow us to study how the unemployed in South Africa
                                                                                                                                                                                                
types in the US.
10 We model this simply as the combined incomes of everyone else in the household divided by the scale-adjusted
household size (the number of household members to the power 0.6; the results are, however, not sensitive to the choice
of the exponent).
11 This privacy cost could additionally be related to marital status.  But since marital status is usually endogenous (many
people combine leaving home with marriage), we do not include it as a separate exogenous variable.  In sensitivity
analyses, we have included it as a separate variable (see below).
12 If we assume negative partial derivatives on the various influences.  Moreover, realistically one would assume that a
person earning a wage will get viewer resources from others in the household than before.  We abstract from this here,
but it may be one of the reasons why employed people typically set up their own household (see below).
7cope with their fate which is examined in more detail in the next three sections.
3. Background and Data
In may be useful to briefly summarise some key features of the South African economy and
labour market. South Africa is a middle income country whose economy depends to a considerable
extent on mining and mineral activities, a sizeable manufacturing sector serving the domestic and
regional markets (about 20% of total employment), a large service sector (including a large
governmental sector), a comparatively small, capital-intensive, commercialised agricultural sector
and a very low-productivity, small-scale subsistence agricultural sector in the former homelands
(with all of agriculture producing about 5% of GDP and absorbing some 10% of employment).  The
apartheid system in place until the transition to black majority rule in the early 1990s had profound
effects on the  economy and the labour market including:13
-discriminatory access to employment in the formal labour market, with whites being favoured by
better education systems, job reservations, and residential and workplace restrictions (pass laws);
-an increasing capital-intensity of production in all sectors of the economy, promoted by an
increasing shortage of skilled labour, subsidies on capital, and attempts by the apartheid state to
lessen the dependence of the ‘white’ economy on unskilled African labour;
-restrictions on the movement of Africans (through pass laws and restrictions on housing and urban
amenities) forcing the majority of Africans into the homelands; this also contributed to the splitting
up of households where working-age members would be allowed to live and work in the cities of
white RSA and their dependants would be forced to reside in the homelands and be dependent on
remittances;
-several legislative measures to eliminate the previously widespread practise of share-cropping, and
‘squatting’ of Africans on white-owned land14;
-prohibitions and restrictions on formal and informal economic activities by Africans, especially for
those residing in non-homeland RSA;
Partly as a result of the inefficiencies and distortions generated by some of the above
policies, per capita growth declined dramatically from 5% in the 1960s to 2% in the 1980s and less
than that in the 1990s.  Employment growth fell to 0.7% in the 1980s and turned negative in the
1990s.15
                                                          
13 See Lundahl (1991), Fallon (1993), Fallon and Lucas (1997), and ILO (1996) for details.
14 Squatting was an arrangement where Africans rented a portion of the land (or sometimes, the entire farm was rented
out in this way) and paid a fixed rent for doing so.  For a discussion see Wilson (1971).
15 Some observers have also pointed to increasing capital intensity, rising union wage premia, and a number of external
shocks (falling gold prices and financial sanctions) as  further factors causing the slowdown in employment growth in
the 1980s (e.g. Fallon and Lucas, 1997).
8With the labour force growing at about 2.5% per year, low and recently negative
employment growth ensured that unemployment increased very rapidly in the 1980s and, by the
1990s reached the levels observed in Table 1.  Moreover, the apartheid legacy (esp. with regards to
education and the labour market) is responsible for the fact that unemployment, employment, and
earnings continue to differ greatly by race which is a more important predictor of employment
prospects and wages than any other factor (including age, gender, education, experience, or location,
see  Klasen, 2000, and Fallon and Lucas, 1997). 16  The decline in job creation in the 1980s and
1990s also led to a steep age profile of unemployment, with unemployment rates among the young
being 5-6 times higher than among older age groups (Klasen and Woolard, 1999, 2000).   Apartheid
policies are also largely responsible for the uneven population distribution of Africans, many of
whom (including most of the elderly) are still crowded in the areas of the former homelands.
Finally, despite the lack of a system of unemployment support or other safety nets targeted at
the unemployed, the one source of social security in South Africa comes in the form of fairly
generous non-contributory means-tested old-age pensions (Case and Deaton, 1998, Ardington and
Lund, 1995).  Since many of the elderly live in rural areas, particularly in the former homelands,
these pensions support many households in those areas, a subject examined in greater detail below.
The data used for the analysis are drawn from two cross-sectional households surveys.  For
1993, the data are drawn from the SALDRU survey, which is similar to conventional Living
Standards Measurement Surveys that are conducted with support of the World Bank in many
developing countries.  It covered 9000 households (in 360 clusters), and included detailed questions
on incomes and expenditures, including modules on informal and subsistence activities.
For 1995, we rely on the October Household Survey covering 30 000 households (this time
in 3000 clusters17) and focused on labour market and informal sector activities.  It has the added
advantage that it included an Income and Expenditure Survey covering 98% of the households
covered by the OHS, thereby allowing a careful analysis of incomes and expenditures as well.18
4. Descriptive Statistics
                                                          
16 This predominance of race as a factor 10 years after the end of all statutory racial discrimination in the labour market
(influx controls, job reservations, and colour bars were lifted in the 1980s), is mostly related to vastly different quality of
education (Case and Deaton, 1996b), the continued impact of past discrimination in the labour market which still has a
powerful influence on the shape of the existing labour force, some persisting discrimination in the labour market (likely
to have persisted until the early 1990s at least), and the absence of any significant job creation which could have
hastened a change in the racial composition of the labour force.
17 The impact on standard errors in a clustered sample of this nature is taken account of in the econometric results.  For
details, see Deaton (1997).
18 Despite small differences in sampling and questionnaire design, Klasen and Woolard (1998a) find that the two
surveys are broadly compatible and yield results consistent with other sources of employment data, so that it they present
a coherent and consistent picture on the state and determinants of employment and unemployment in South Africa.
9In motivating the econometric analysis, this section provides some descriptive statistics on
how the unemployed are able to get access to resources despite the near absence of unemployment
insurance.19  This can be done using a person-level and household-level analysis.  The former
investigates in what types of households unemployed individuals live; the latter asks what share of
households contain various combinations of employed, unemployed, and inactive (out of the labour
force) individuals.
The person-level analysis is shown in Table 2.  It shows that about 60% of the unemployed
live in households where someone is employed.  Another 20% of the unemployed live in
households that receive remittances from an absent household member, which is related to the
migrant labour system created by apartheid era restrictions on movements.  Thus about 80% of the
unemployed are able to depend on labour income from a present (or absent) household member, and
only 20% of all unemployed (or about 0.8 million) live in households with no connection to the
labour market whatever.  This is a very small share indeed, certainly when compared to countries
such as the UK, Germany, or Ireland where more than 50% of the unemployed live in households
where no one else is employed (OECD, 1998). Among rural Africans, the largest group among the
unemployed, the relations are similar, although a greater share rely on remittances, and fewer on
employment income in the household.
Table 3 examines the distribution of employed and unemployed within households.  With
high unemployment rates such as those prevailing in South Africa, we would expect a high
proportion of households with no connection to the labour market.  But this is not the case.  Table 4
show that the vast majority of households (70%) contains no unemployed person.  Given the racial
differences in unemployment rates (Figure 1) and the near absence of interracial households, most
white and Indian, and a large share of Coloured households are among this group of households
with no unemployed. 20% of households contain one unemployed person; very few contain more
than 3 unemployed. In 15% of households, no one is employed, but they do receive remittances.  At
the same time, 12.6% of households do not receive remittances and contain no one who is
employed.  Thus these households have no connection to the labour market. This is again much
lower than in OECD countries. In OECD countries, the average unemployment rate stood at 7.6% in
1996; yet 18% of all households which included a working age person contained no one who is
employed.  In contrast to South Africa, a much higher jobless rate produces a much lower rate of
jobless households.20
                                                          
19 See ILO (1996) and Fallon and Lucas (1997) for a similar, but somewhat more cursory analysis.
20 The comparison understates the difference as the South African figure includes pensioners living alone where we
would not expect a connection to the labour market (see Table 6), while the OECD figures do not.  Including them in the
OECD figures would, for example, raise the share of households containing no one in employment to about 29% in
10
The two analyses together imply that employment and unemployment are much more widely
distributed across households than in OECD countries.  This is particularly surprising given the fact
that, due to racial differences in unemployment, white households (and, to a lesser extent, Indian
households) are largely insulated from the burden of unemployment.  This implies that among
African households, the burden of unemployment is particularly widely dispersed, with many
households containing one unemployed, and relatively few more than one.  In the next section we
will examine how this wide dispersion of unemployment is achieved through shifts in household
composition.  At this stage, it suffices to note that the vast majority of the unemployed and the vast
majority of households containing unemployed persons have access to labour income and thus
provide an important private safety net.  At the same time, this private safety net does not cover
everyone and leaves some 20% of the unemployed and some 12% of households without access to
labour income.
What do the households without access to labour income live off? Some 25% of the 1.1
million households with no connection to the labour market21consist of predominantly white retired
persons relying on private pensions or private incomes; it is the other 75% that are of concern and
their sources of incomes are shown in Table 4, which only examines sources of incomes for African
households with no labour market connection.  About 60% of these households receive the (non-
contributory means-tested old age) social pension, disability, or child maintenance grant (with the
social pensions being by far the most important source);22 another 7% receive a private pension or
unemployment insurance.  For those households that receive none of these sources, the incomes are
extremely low (only R104 or $35 per adult equivalent, putting them in the poorest decile), and
include minimal agricultural incomes, some minor wage or self-employment income (for
employment of less than 5 hours a week), some private income, or no incomes at all.23
Thus the private safety net for the unemployed also includes state support in the form of old-
age social pensions and other social grants paid out to household members other than the
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Germany.
21 This is consistent with the figure of 835,000 unemployed living in households with no connection to the labour market
(Table 3), as nearly 60% of the 1.1 million households with no connection to the labour market contain no one who is
employed, but also no one who is unemployed, i.e. everyone is out of the labour force.  These households consist
mostly, and in nearly equal absolute numbers each, of white and African pensioners living alone (suggesting, of course,
that a much larger percentage of white than African pensioners live alone).
22 In addition, many households that contain employed members also receive state support in the form of social pensions
and disability grants.  All in all, 31% of the households containing at least one unemployed receive state support;
equivalently, 34% of all unemployed live in households with state support.
23 The minimal wage and self-employment income is included as people working fewer than 5 hours a week were not
counted as employed.  This last group of households did report expenditures but no incomes which is either due to
underreporting of incomes in the survey or the fact that these households indeed earn no incomes currently and are
drawing down on assets they may have or incurring debt.  It is a small number and thus gives as some reassurance that
the survey is tracking most income sources.
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unemployed.24  But even this indirect public safety net does not stretch far enough to include
everyone and leaves a significant portion of households in utter destitution.
5. Unemployment and Household Formation: Evidence
Knowing that (virtually) all unemployed find themselves in households with some market
and non-market resources of other households members begs the question how this is achieved.  In
this section we investigate to what extent this is a results of explicit household formation strategies
of the unemployed.
In an exploratory analysis in Table 5, we have classified persons of working age according to
their position in the household, which we measure via their relationship to the household head.25 If
we hypothesise that unemployed persons are likely to attach themselves to another household to
seek support we would not expect many unemployed to be household heads or spouses of the head
but instead to be living with their parents or other relatives (and thus their relation to the household
head would be child, sister, cousin, nephew, or niece of the household head).
We grouped all possible relationships to the household head into five groups: they are either
the household head or his/her spouse (‘head/spouse’ in Table 5), they are children less than 25 years
old living with their parents (‘kid<25’), children 25 or over living with their parents (‘kid>25’),
people living with siblings, living with other family (e.g. they are nephew, niece, cousin, parent,
grandparents, uncle, aunt, or grandchildren of the household head) or non-family.
The results of the table are striking.  75% of the employed are either household heads or
their spouses, suggesting that employment ensures that people can set up independent households.
We compare this to the two types of unemployed, the strict and broad unemployed.  To investigate
the difference between those two types of unemployed, we treat the two categories throughout the
subsequent analysis as exclusive categories, i.e. the broad unemployed only include those that are
willing to work but have given up looking, and the narrow only those that want to work and are
actively searching.
In contrast to employed people, for the strictly (broadly) unemployed, the household position
is very different.  Only 34% (30%) of them head households or are married to household heads,
while a surprising 26% (26%) of them are children aged 25 or over still living with their parents.26
Another 23% (26%) are children below 25 living with their parents, and 7% (7%) live with siblings,
                                                          
24 This is again in contrast to OECD countries.  While also there some 60-90% of households with no one in
employment rely on social transfers, most of these transfers consist of unemployment support to the unemployed
household member (OECD 1998).
25 In all the analysis of this section, we rely on the 1995 October Household Survey.  We replicated the analysis with the
1993 SALDRU survey and found very similar results.  For details, refer to Klasen and Woolard (1998).
26 These figures are strikingly similar to the situation in today’s Mediterranean countries.  See Gallie and Paugham
(2000).
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aunts, or cousins, and another 10% (11%) live with other family.
Thus the unemployed appear to have a lower propensity to set up their own households;
instead,  they stay with their parents, or move in with close (or more distant) relatives. Similar to the
findings of Ellwood and Bane (1985) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993, 1994) which showed that
less generous welfare payments led to a higher incidence of single mothers living with their parents,
the absence of unemployment support in South Africa prevents the unemployed from forming their
own households.  This can then also explain the contrast between the distribution of unemployment
among households in OECD countries and South Africa.  Support to the unemployed in OECD
countries allows households with no one in employment to persist and thus accounts for their high
share; in South Africa, many of these households could not exist and the unemployed distribute
themselves among household with access to private and public incomes.
To investigate this issue further and place it in the context of the theoretical framework
discussed in section 2, we specify a multinomial logit model predicting the likelihood of each
relationship to the household head.   We distinguish between various destination states including
being household head or spouse of the household head (reference category), being a child living
with his/her parents, living with other family and living with non-family.  In the last two categories,
we also distinguish between whether this household is in rural or urban areas to capture the
possibility that people may move between rural and urban areas as a result of unemployment.27
Despite the fairly large number of categories, the regressions do not violate the independence of
irrelevant alternatives condition, as determined by a series of Hausman tests.
We include narrow and broad unemployment (with employment being the excluded
category) as covariates (again treating them as exclusive categories as described above).  We restrict
the sample to people in the labour force, thus excluding the inactives.28  In line with the discussion
in section 2, the regressions also control for age, education, race, and the scale-adjusted per capita
income of the household one is located in.29  The regressions are estimated separately for males and
females.  Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model.  Using these
regressions, we can then predict to what extent employment status affects the relationship to the
household head and thus household formation.
                                                          
27 For example, a person may move back to an aunt or grandmother in a rural area after becoming unemployed in an
urban area. We cannot split each category to a rural and urban component since in some cases, the decision to move in
with a certain relative automatically prescribes whether this involves living in rural or urban areas.  For example, for
children deciding to stay with their parents (or move back to them) this does not allow them to separately choose
whether to live in urban or rural areas (as this depends on the location of the parents).  For most of the other household
relations, such a separate choice is likely to be possible in most cases.
28 The household relation of the inactives are very much dependent on the reason for their inactivity (e.g. whether it is
due to formal education, domestic responsibilities, disability, or retirement).
29 This is net of one’s own income to give a sense of how many additional resources one may be able to draw upon.
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This type of analysis only examines the end results of the link between employment and the
relationship to household head and can say little about the process that created this outcome.  It is
possible that unemployment prevented people from setting up their own household in the first place
and thus they live longer with their parents than employed persons.  Alternatively, they may have
moved back to their parents or relatives in response to unemployment.30 We will investigate this
issue further by examining information about migration in the survey and the results of a re-survey
of part of the 1993 sample in 1998.
Table 7 show the results for the multinomial logit for males.  The results confirm some of
the findings of the model.  In particular, age has the predicted effect of older people preferring to
live on their own rather than be in another household.  The influence of income is as expected; the
higher the household income, the more attractive it is to be attached to such a household rather than
setting up one’s own.  Education has a varying influence on household formation.  While higher
education reduces the chance of living with one’s parents and with relatives or non-relatives in
urban areas, it increases the chance of staying with relatives in rural areas, all compared to being
household head or spouse.  This provides an interesting contrast between those who attach
themselves in rural and urban areas which will be explored in greater detail below.31
For the purposes of this analysis, it is particularly important to see that being unemployed
significantly reduces the chance of being household head or spouse.  Thus the results from the
cross-tabulations in Table 5 carry over to the multivariate context.  Unemployment either prevents
the setting up of a household or leads the unemployed to attach themselves to other households in
search of support.   These results still hold even if we control for additional variables such as marital
status or household size.32
This importance of the link between unemployment and household formation is shown in
some simulations in Table 8.  We compare the simulated effects of being employed, differentiating
between African and whites, and being broadly and narrowly unemployed on household formation.
Ceteris paribus, the switch from being employed to being unemployed reduces the chance of being
household head or spouse by about 30 percentage points, which is considerably larger than all other
effects in the regression, including the large racial differences in household structure.  Instead, the
                                                          
30 There is also the (somewhat remote) possibility that unemployment simply leads to a renaming of the household head
and thus the relationships to the household head.  For example, if the person of the younger generation becomes
unemployed, household headship may move up to the parents and they are now called child.  Qualitative evidence from
South Africa suggests, however, that this is not a likely possibility.
31 There are also interesting racial differences in household formation patterns in Table 8 which shall not detain us here.
32 Since marital status and household size are endogenous variables that are themselves influenced by employment
status, it is not appropriate to treat them as exogenous regressors.  The fact that their inclusion still generates significant
results for the unemployment variables suggests that plenty of unemployed married people still live with their parents or
with other results and that marriage and setting up a household are far from synonymous in South Africa.  The
regressions are available on request.
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unemployed have a much higher propensity of living with one’s parents, although living with other
family also is considerably more likely now.
To what extent is this result driven by active migration in response to unemployment, or is it
the failure of young unemployed people to leave the home of parents or relatives that is driving the
results?  The OHS contains information on recent migration (last 12 months) and birthplace
migration, but unfortunately does not state reasons for the migration.33  The migration information
yields three distinct patterns of migration as shown in Table 9.   The first, among those in
employment, appear to have moved to set up their own household.  The employed have a much
higher propensity to move; about 50% have left their birth place and 91% have done so to set up a
household.  The second pattern is that among the broad and narrow unemployed, the propensity to
migrate is much smaller.  Only some 25% of each group has migrated.  The vast majority who have
not migrated remained in their parental household.  Thus unemployment is a powerful force of
regional immobility, similar to claims made about regional rigidity in Spanish and Italian labor
markets (Bentolila and Ichino, 2000).  Third, of those that have moved, most have also set up
households though more than half of these were women who joined households rather than male
heads of households.  In addition, however, a significant minority of other unemployed who have
moved have attached themselves to households of family and non-family, presumably in search of
support, and some seem to have returned to parental households. Thus this information suggests that
the predominant portion of the household formation response to unemployment occurs via staying
with the parents, while a considerable minority react to unemployment by attaching themselves to
the household of relatives and non-family, and some return to their parents.34
In the appendix, we expand the multinominal logit model to distinguish between those that
have moved from the town of their birth in each category of the five categories used before (see
appendix Tables 1, 2).  Also here it is clear that the predominant response to unemployment is
staying with one’s parents while a significant minority move to join family and non-family, and
some return to their parents.
The Africans included in the 1993 SALDRU survey from the most populous province,
KwaZulu-Natal, containing some 20% of all Africans in that survey, were resurveyed in 1998.  This
allows us to see whether the employment status has had an impact on changes in household
                                                          
33 Note that birthplace migration is an imperfect proxy of migration in response to labour market events.  First, if people
stayed in the same town but changed household, this will not be captured.  Second, migration could have taken place for
other reasons.  If children moved with their parents, we assume that this is not of relevance for our analysis as the
children did not change household and thus we treat them as if they had not moved.
34 While this is the most likely interpretation of the table, it is possible that some of the unemployed who live as children
could have returned to the parental home (and not be regarded as having migrated since their current place of residence
is their place of birth) and also some might have moved with other family or non-family.  Given the close correlation
with employment status, the interpretation advanced above seems more plausible for most cases.
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formation.35  Table 3 in the appendix shows the results.  Those who were employed in both periods
were much more likely to become head or remain head of household, while those who remained
unemployed or had become unemployed predominantly remained with their parents.  A small share
returned to their parents in search of support and a much larger share of those that became
unemployed remained or became attached to households headed by other family.  This also support
the finding that the largest household formation response to unemployment is to remain in the
parental house while a significant minority adapt by attaching themselves to households of other
family.
Another important finding emerges from Tables 7 and 8.  When examining the difference
between the narrow and broad unemployed and their household formation patterns, the narrow
unemployed have a relatively higher propensity to attach themselves to household of relatives and
non-family in urban areas (14.7% in urban areas, only 5.1% in rural areas), while among the broad
unemployed the difference is much smaller (11.6% in urban areas versus 6.4% in rural areas).
Combined with the finding that also the more educated are more likely to find themselves in
households of relatives and non-family in urban areas, this suggests that the unemployed differ in
their reaction to unemployment.  One group with bleaker job prospects, poorer education, and better
access to resources in rural areas (relatives in work, pensions, land, etc.), fewer connections in urban
areas, deterred by the high costs of urban living, and possibly less motivation remains in rural areas
or goes to rural areas to attach themselves to a household of parents and relatives.  This group does
not engage in search activities and thus ends up among the broad unemployed.36
The second group, with better job prospects, less access to resources in rural areas, better
connections in urban areas, more education, and possibly more motivation, attaches themselves
more often to a household of relatives or non-family in urban areas and then searches for
employment.  The correlation between attachment to households of relatives or even non-family in
urban areas and narrow unemployment would, if it is indeed a result of a conscious household
formation decision, suggest a keen desire among this group to be close to jobs and actively seek
them; conversely, the correlation between broad unemployment and living with relatives in rural
areas may be more motivated by a desire to seek economic support (at the possible expense of job
prospects).  This would be consistent with the theoretical framework outlined above.  People who
have a low probability of getting a job will value the certain access to resources (wherever that may
be) more highly than the potential losses associated with being in an areas with low labour demand.
                                                          
35 With the 1998 resurvey, we have another data point on employment status and household formation, but no
information on developments inbetween.
36 Other factors that may contribute to this segmentation of the unemployed could be language, education, and existence
of a household in urban areas to which they could move to.
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Conversely, those who believe they can get a higher-paying job will value being in a labour market
with higher labour demand and thus adjust their household formation decision accordingly.
The results on migration and household formation (shown in the appendix) are generally in
support of the interpretation about the narrow and broad unemployed being drawn from two
different groups.  First, there is a general correlation between broad unemployment and having
stayed in one’s town of birth (78% of the broad unemployed have never moved, compared to 73%
of the narrow unemployed).  Moreover, there is a positive correlation between narrow
unemployment, having moved to urban areas, and being attached to a household headed by other
family.  7.5% of the narrow unemployed have moved to urban areas and attached themselves to a
household of relatives or non-family, compared to only 1.8% who have moved to rural areas to
attach themselves to such households.  In contrast, only 4.2% of the broad unemployed have moved
to urban areas to attach themselves to such households, compared with 2.2% who moved to rural
areas.  This is consistent with the view that the group with better labour market prospects are more
likely to move to urban areas and search, while those with fewer prospects are relatively more likely
to remain in, or go to rural areas to seek economic support and not search.
Tables 10 and 11 show the respective regressions and simulations for women.  Here the
impact of unemployment on household formation is somewhat more muted, presumably due to the
fact that it is easier for an unemployed female to be spouse of a household head than for an
unemployed male to be household head.  But the same household formation effects are still present.
Moreover, the difference between the narrow and broad unemployed also appears to be present
among females.
Household formation responses of the unemployed thus strongly influence the household
and locational pattern of unemployment.  Unemployment in many cases precludes the maintenance
of an independent household and thus leads the unemployed to seek support in other households.
This happens in the form of staying in the parent’s home or moving back to parents and relatives in
response to unemployment.  Employment, on the other hand, allows the creation of a new and
independent household, often in a different location.
This can now partly explain the puzzle of rural unemployment.37  An unemployed stays in,
or moves to rural areas primarily for the economic support he or she can get there, rather than the
(very limited) labour market opportunities.  Potential economic support for the unemployed is
particularly high in rural areas, esp. in the former homelands, as apartheid residential policies
ensured that most families were forced to take up residence there and since the social pensions paid
to the elderly, who live predominantly in those areas, now provide considerable public support for
                                                          
37 See also Klasen and Woolard (1998) for other reasons for high rural unemployment in South Africa.
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remaining there.  This draws many unemployed away from most employment opportunities and may
thus provide a disincentive to search and find employment, an issue that is investigated in the next
section.  Moreover, it appears that those who choose to relocate or stay in rural ares are self-selected
to the extent that they have lower employment prospects (and possibly motivation) to begin with.
Reducing unemployment among this group will therefore be a particularly challenging task.
Conversely, those who attach themselves to households of relatives in urban areas and are actively
searching are likely to be among the first to find employment.
6. The Consequences of Household Formation Decisions of the Unemployed
The analysis so far has suggested that location decisions of the unemployed are heavily
influenced by the availability of economic support and may therefore lead them away from places
where it is profitable to search for employment.   In this section we want to examine two
consequences of this household formation behaviour.  The first is to investigate the impact of this
behaviour on the welfare of the unemployed and the welfare of households hosting them.  As
already mentioned in section 4, this private safety net that operates via household formation does
not work for everyone.  While most unemployed are able to get access to resources this way, the
amount of resources varies greatly and some are facing utter destitution.  Thus this private safety net
generates considerable risks for those who have to rely on it.
In addition, those who are the providers of the safety net also have to shoulder a
considerable burden for their willingness to support the unemployed.  This is shown in Table 12
which shows a simple regression of annual household income per adult equivalent among Africans,
using the 1995 Income and Expenditure Survey.  Adding an unemployed member to a household
reduces adult equivalent expenditures by over R1600 (over R500 for adding one more person based
on household size, and nearly R1100 for that person being unemployed).   This is brought out even
more forcefully in Table 11 which shows a strong correlation between unemployment and
household poverty.  In 1995, some 65% of the broad and 59% of the narrow unemployed found
themselves in households situated in the poorest two quintiles (defined by adult equivalent
expenditures).  51% of the people in the poorest quintile live in households where no one is
employed, and only 17% of the working age population in the lowest quintile actually has a job.
With rising joblessness in the 1990s, this burden of unemployment on households is
increasing in South Africa.  As unemployment is rising, so is the number of unemployed people
relying on other household members for their resources.  This is shown in Table 14 which shows
that the share of households that contain one or more unemployed has rising from 30% to over 35%
of all households between 1993 and 1997.  While the total number of households has increased by
18
some 9%, the number of household having to support four or more unemployed has risen by about
50%.
Thus the private safety net ensures basic survival for most unemployed but this system drags
the benefactors into poverty and rising joblessness increases the strain on this private safety net
considerably.  More and more people are involuntarily crowded into households and have to share
the resources available.
Another consequence of the location decision of the unemployed is the potential impact on
search behaviour.  To further investigate whether the nature of economic support received by the
household provides a disincentive on labour market participation and search, we examine
participation and search decisions as well as employment prospects at the household level.38  In
particular, we estimate a model predicting participation in the labour force, search activities, and
employment prospects based on income sources of the household and other labour market
characteristics.  The first regression could indicate to what extent households rely on the labour
market for resources, the second gives an impression of the influences on search costs for the
unemployed, and the third should shed some light on the ability to get employment offers and on the
willingness to accept such offers.
Since we specify the model at the household level, we try to predict the share of adults in a
household who report to be in the broad labour force (regression 1 in Table 13), the share of those in
the broad labour force who are also in the narrow labour force (employed or searching, regression
2), and the share of those in the narrow labour force who are employed (regression 3), respectively.
Since the causality between remittance income and labour market behaviour may run in both
directions (i.e. household may receive remittance income because they have no one employed), we
have used the existence of an absent members of a household as an instrument for remittance
income and estimate the model using Two Stage Least Squares.39
Table 13  shows the results. Age, education, gender, and location have the expected signs
and are all significant.  Remittance income is negatively correlated with labour force participation,
search activities, and employment prospects.  Similarly, pension and non-wage private income in
the household are also correlated with lower labour force participation, search activities, and
employment prospects of the adult household members.  This effect is the strongest in the second
regression suggesting that these income sources have the strongest impact on reducing search
activities.  Since some 31% of all household containing unemployed people receive such state
                                                          
38 We examine this question at the household level under the presumption that labour force decision are taken at the
household level, with individuals taking the decisions of others into account.
39 As a benchmark, we ran Ordinary Least Squared regressions using the same variables (and without the instrument).
The coefficients do not differ much from the OLS regressions.  The instrument passes tests for relevance (it significantly
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support, this finding should be of some concern to policy-makers.40
These findings could either mean that remittance, pension and non-wage private income
raise the reservation wage. 41 Alternatively, they could mean that unemployed people attach
themselves to households with pension or remittance income, which might reduce search activities
and employment prospects if the household receiving pensions and remittances is in rural areas.42
This could be due to high search costs there which reduce search activities or due to low
employment prospects which would lower employment rates.  Given the discussion above on the
endogeneity of household formation, this latter interpretation is more likely and does indeed suggest
a pattern of household formation that takes some unemployed people away from job prospects and
into households with pensions and remittances in rural areas which then causes them do cease
searching.43
We also examine the determinants of reservation wages of the unemployed to examine
whether pension and private incomes constitute a direct disincentive to search by raising the
reservation wage.  Table 15 shows the results of the regressions for monthly reservation wages,
based on the 1993 SALDRU survey.44  We use the Heckman correction for this regression to
address the sample selection bias of the reservation wage equation. We use the a worker-specific (by
province, age, gender, and education group of the worker)45 local unemployment rate and urban
location as identifying variables for the selection equation.  Although the regression coefficients do
not differ greatly between the OLS and the Heckman regression, the Wald test indicates that
                                                                                                                                                                                                
influenced the remittance variable proxied for), and it passes the Overidentification Restriction Test.
40 Similarly, some 35% of the unemployed live in households which receive state support.
41 It should, however, be pointed out that pension income is likely to have fewer disincentive effects than other forms of
support to the unemployed (such as direct unemployment benefits) as the pension income of an elderly member of the
household will not be reduced when an adult member of the household finds employment.
42 The negative coefficients on household incomes do not mean that these forms of income serve to increase
unemployment.  In fact, to the extent that pension, private, and remittance income reduces labour force participation, it
contributes to lowering the unemployment rate as it reduces labour supply and relieves pressure on the labour market;
the negative coefficient in regression 3 also says nothing about influence on the unemployment rate but only says
something about who among the narrow labour force is likely to get employment.  Only to the extent that other
household income (such as pension income) reduces search activities and employment of adult members of households,
it may contribute to increasing the unemployment rate by raising reservation wages and by increasing rigidities in the
labour market. An alternative interpretation could be that those with other forms of income are searching less actively
and thereby are less successful in securing employment.
43 Table 10 also supports our earlier contention about the two groups of unemployed in the following two ways.  First,
the high and significant coefficient on education and on urban and metropolitan areas in regression (2) supports the
finding that there are two groups of unemployed.  Those with better job prospects (for which education may be a good
proxy) are more likely to go to urban areas, attach themselves to relatives and search, while those with worse job
prospects fall back to rural areas and do not search.  Second, regression (3) shows that employment prospects are indeed
worse for those with lower education, and for those who have other income sources, which may suggest that those who
attach themselves to other households with pension or other income correctly perceive their lower employment
prospects.
44 Unfortunately, OHS 1995 did not ask this question.
45 Each worker was assigned an unemployment rate which was the unemployment rate prevailing among the same age,
education, gender, and province group to which the worker belongs
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selectivity is indeed a problem so that it was right to address the potential selectivity issue.
While province, race, gender, age, and education have large and significant impact on the
reservation wages (as one would expect), pension and remittance incomes do not appear to raise
reservation wages.  Only self-employment income and private income is associated with higher
reservation wages.  Thus we find little evidence of a direct disincentive effect of pension and
remittance income on search activities and employment prospects through higher reservation
wages.46
This provides further confirmation that the linkages between pension and remittance income
and search and employment prospects operates via changes in household formation rather than
directly via an increase in the reservation wage.  The unemployed get stuck in rural households to
get support from pensions and remittances and thereby reduce their search and employment
prospects.  The direct impact of household income on search and employment prospects, operating
via an increase in the reservation wage, does not appear to be of significant magnitude (and may not
exist at all).
6. Conclusion
We started out by posing the question about the factors that can explain the persistence of
high unemployment in rural areas in a situation of flexible labour markets and no significant
unemployment insurance.
We were able to show that the unemployed are dispersed widely among South African
households ensuring that most of the unemployed have access to employment income or state
transfers received by other household members.  While this insures some resource access, this
private safety net does not cover everyone.  Moreover, it drags many of the households supporting
unemployed people into poverty and involuntarily increases household sizes.
One interesting policy issue emerges immediately from this.  If South Africa succeeded in
substantially reducing unemployment, this would then lead to many of the previously unemployed
seeking to set up independent households which, in turn, would drastically increase the demand for
housing and associated municipal services.  The current strain on the private safety system would
make way for strain on the housing market and municipal services.
The mechanism allowing for the wide dispersion of the unemployed is through adjustments
in the household boundaries.  Unemployed people never get to be household heads or spouse (or
cease to be household head) and stay in (or move to) households of parents of relatives.  The
                                                          
40 We know of no other study that has examined the impact of pensions on reservation wages; given the importance of
the issue, the policy debates on the effects of pensions may take note of this finding.
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information on migration and a resurvey on part of the sample suggest that this response operates
mainly via staying in the parental household, thus reducing labour market mobility considerably.
Given that many of these households are in rural areas, and are being sustained by pensions and
remittances, unemployed (esp. the less educated and employable ones) will go to (or remain in) rural
areas to draw on these resources which thereby reduces their search activities and employment
prospects.  This prolongs their unemployment spells and leads to the emergence of rural
unemployment which is not related to rural labour markets but simply to the location decisions of
the unemployed.  While the social pensions and other state support thus are able to support the
unemployed (among other poor people, see Deaton and Case, 1997), they appear to contribute to
lower labour market mobility and may, from that perspective, be inferior to direct support to the
unemployed person, wherever they are.47
At the same time, we find no evidence of a direct disincentive effect of household income on
reservation wages which supports our contention that the reduced search activity of households
receiving pension and remittance income is a result of the location decision of the unemployed.
Several important policy conclusions emerge from these findings.  First, unemployment can
persist at very high levels even in the absence of unemployment support.  Similar to the claim made
by Ellwood and Bane that the absence of welfare would not solve the problem of single-parent
households, we find that the absence of unemployment support will not solve the problem of
unemployment.
Second, a private safety net can, in theory, partly replace public support for the unemployed.
But this private safety net does not cover everyone and leaves some unemployed and their
dependants in utter destitution.  Moreover, it drags many households supporting the unemployed
also into poverty.  And finally, in the South African case, it heavily depends on the existence of
state transfers to pensioners which indirectly supports the unemployed.
Third, reliance on a private safety net generates disincentive effects that can prolong
unemployment.  In particular, it forces the unemployed to base their location decisions on the
availability of economic support rather than on the best location for employment search.  In the
South African case, where a lot of economic support (esp. the social pensions)48 is based in rural
areas, this leads to low labour market mobility, reduces search activities (since there are few
prospects of employment) and thus prolongs unemployment.  Similar arguments have been
advanced for explaining high unemployment and low regional mobility among the young in Spain
                                                          
47 At the same time, there are other advantages to the social pensions as support for the unemployed, compared to
unemployment insurance.  In particular, they provide no direct disincentive effect.  See also Case and Deaton (1997).
48 As a legacy of apartheid-era restrictions on mobility, the policy to force inactives into the homelands, and the high
costs of living in urban areas, most of the elderly reside in rural areas.
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(Bentolila and Ichino, 2000).
Thus we are faced with a rather counterintuitive overall conclusion: the absence of
unemployment support may not only lower welfare of the unemployed and their dependants, it may
not do much to reduce unemployment duration, and may actually increase it.  The debates about
incentive effects of unemployment support in OECD countries may want to take note of this
finding.  
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Table 1 Unemployment rates, by location
Strict unemp. rate Broad unemp. rate
1993
Rural
Urban
All
13.1
12.4
12.7
38.7
23.3
29.4
1994
Rural
Urban
All
28.9
13.5
19.5
42.3
28.8
34.1
1995
Rural
Urban
All
26.1
11.8
16.9
36.6
24.0
28.5
1996
Rural
Urban
All
25.7
19.5
21.0
47.1
31.1
35.6
1997
Rural
Urban
All
26.9
21.5
22.9
49.5
32.6
37.6
1998
Rural
Urban
All
30.0
21.8
24.3
48.4
32.6
37.5
1999
Rural
Urban
All
27.9
22.2
24.0
47.7
33.0
38.2
Source: Saldru (1993), CSS (1994, 1995, 1998, 2000).  Please note that the figures are not entirely comparable, for
reasons explained in Klasen and Woolard (1999, 2000).  But they present the correct orders of magnitude.
Figure 1: Unemployment Rates by Race in 1997
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Table 2: Labour Market Connections of Unemployed Individuals (‘000)
All Unemployed Rural African Unemployed
Number Share Number Share
No one employed, no remittances 835 20.2 655 21.4
No one employed, remittances 878 21.3 783 25.6
1 employed 1,557 37.7 1,063 34.7
2-3 employed 792 19.2 502 16.4
4+ employed 69 1.7 58 1.9
Total 4,130 100 3,061 100
Source: Saldru 1993.
Table 3:The Number of Employed and Unemployed among Adults in Households (%)
Number of Unemployed
Number of Employed 0 1 2-3 4+ Total
0, no remittances 7.1 3.2 2.1 0.3 12.6
0, remittances 8.3 4.3 2.1 0.1 14.8
1 31.6 2.6 2.9 0.4 43.8
2-3 22.0 3.4 1.6 0.3 27.3
4+ 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.5
Total 70.0 19.9 8.9 1.2 100.0
Source: Saldru 1993.
Table 4: Income Sources of African Households with no Labour Market Connection
Number
('000)
Share Mean
Amount (R.)
Social Grants 502 60.0% 429
Private Pension 24 2.9% 586
Unemployment  Insurance 39 4.7% 551
Private Income 74 8.9% 300
Wage Income/Self-Emp.* 97 11.6% 526
Agriculture 284 34.0% 86
No Income 114 13.6% 0
Total w/o Wage or  Remittances 836 135.6% 417
Note: Social grants consist primarily of social pensions, but also include disability and child maintenance grants.   The wage or self-
employment income included here only includes workers working less than 5 hours a week; those were counted as unemployed in
the analysis above.  The total share adds up to more than 100% as some households have access to more than one of the listed
income sources.  In 1993, a $ was worth about 3.5 Rands so that average household incomes from these sources was about $115 a
month.  Source: Saldru (1993).
Table 5: Living Arrangements of Adult Individuals in 1995 (Relationship to Household Head)
Inactive Employed Strictly
Unemployed
Broadly
Unemployed
Total
Head/Spouse 33.0 74.9 34.0 30.4 50.0
Kid<25 living with Parents 43.7 7.7 22.9 25.7 25.8
Kid>25 living with Parents 6.7 10.2 25.7 25.7 11.2
Living with Sibling 3.8 2.3 6.8 7.0 3.7
Living with Other Family 12.4 3.1 9.8 10.5 8.3
Living with Non Family 0.5 1.8 0.7 0.8 1.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CSS (1995).  The most important categories among ‘other family’ are people living with uncles, aunts, and
cousins.  The fairly high proportion of inactive adults living with other family is largely due to school and university age
children living other family for school location reasons.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics Used in Regression
Males Females
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
African 0.64 0.48 0.68 0.47
Coloured 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37
Indian 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17
Pcnetinc 7.25 29.57 10.46 24.72
Narrow 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.38
Broad 0.11 0.32 0.20 0.40
Age 36.37 11.06 34.70 10.53
Education 6.64 3.86 6.71 3.79
Note: Pcnetinc refers to the scale-adjusted per capita income of other household members, in thousands of Rands per
year.
Table 7: Multinomial Logit Model of Relationship to Household Head, Males (1995)
Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Statistic Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Statistic
Child living with Parents Non-Family, Rural
African 1.418 0.125 11.362 African 2.761 1.134 2.434
Coloured 1.503 0.132 11.352 Coloured 1.548 1.152 1.345
Indian 1.317 0.147 8.949 Indian 0.636 1.319 0.482
Pcntinc 0.023 0.005 4.204 Pcntinc 0.030 0.007 4.406
Narrow 2.373 0.087 27.348 Narrow 0.278 0.563 0.494
Broad 2.595 0.090 28.753 Broad 1.011 0.481 2.100
Age -0.173 0.004 -41.110 Age -0.127 0.023 -5.623
Education 0.013 0.009 1.341 Education -0.213 0.055 -3.843
Constant 2.699 0.188 14.326 Constant -2.562 1.345 -1.904
Other Family-Rural Non-Family, Urban
African 4.569 0.581 7.860 African 1.182 0.594 1.989
Coloured 3.507 0.627 5.596 Coloured 1.096 0.404 2.715
Indian 2.925 0.772 3.789 Indian 0.051 0.496 0.103
Pcntinc 0.026 0.007 3.748 Pcntinc 0.026 0.007 3.921
Narrow 2.174 0.146 14.940 Narrow 0.611 0.499 1.223
Broad 2.551 0.135 18.956 Broad 0.070 0.545 0.128
Age -0.165 0.009 -19.288 Age -0.057 0.018 -3.221
Education -0.105 0.015 -6.830 Education -0.021 0.027 -0.773
Constant -1.997 0.625 -3.198 Constant -2.724 0.821 -3.317
Other Family-Urban
African 2.233 0.336 6.653
Coloured 2.533 0.334 7.578
Indian 2.130 0.339 6.290 N 22988
Pcntinc 0.024 0.006 4.121 F (40, 2864) 88.78
Narrow 2.532 0.119 21.199 Prob>F 0.00
Broad 2.403 0.127 18.986
Age -0.123 0.006 -20.063
Education 0.044 0.014 3.183
Constant -1.354 0.411 -3.294
Note: The standard errors take account of the clustered nature of the sample.  Hausman tests were performed to test for the IIA
hypothesis and the results failed to reject the IIA hypothesis.
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Table 8: Predictions of Household Status, Males.
Employed
All
Employed
White
Employed
African
Broad
Unemp
African
Narrow
Unemp
African
Head/Spouse 65.1% 80.3% 62.6% 32.0% 33.5%
Child 25.4% 17.3% 26.5% 50.0% 46.6%
Other Family-Rural 2.5% 0.1% 3.2% 6.1% 5.0%
Other Family-Urban 5.3% 1.5% 5.7% 11.0% 13.5%
NonFamily-Rural 0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1%
NonFamily-Urban 1.4% 0.8% 1.7% 0.6% 1.2%
Note: The table is based on predictions using the results from Table 7.
Table 9: Birthplace Migration by Employment Status
Employed Broad Unemployed Narrow Unemployed
Stayed Moved Stayed Moved Stayed Moved
Head/Spouse 58.2 91.4 24.6 67.4 20.0 62.7
Child 34.5 1.5 60.5 7.2 66.0 6.0
Other Family 6.2 4.6 14.4 24.3 13.5 29.8
Non-Family 1.0 2.5 0.6 1.2 0.5 1.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Observations 15700 15868 5268 1470 4673 1509
Note: Observations are weighted to mirror population distribution.
Table 9: Multinomial Logit Model of Relationship to Household Head, Females (1995)
Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Statistic Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Statistic
Child living with Parents Non-Family, Rural
African 1.479 0.108 13.693 African 2.486 0.812 3.063
Coloured 1.705 0.124 13.734 Coloured 1.817 0.847 2.144
Indian 1.289 0.157 8.189 Indian -25.092 0.632 -39.696
Pcntinc -0.002 0.002 -1.261 Pcntinc 0.006 0.002 3.729
Narrow 0.914 0.071 12.893 Narrow -1.751 0.744 -2.355
Broad 0.852 0.067 12.710 Broad -0.431 0.446 -0.966
Age -0.141 0.004 -39.071 Age -0.080 0.018 -4.495
Education 0.050 0.008 6.315 Education -0.149 0.064 -2.333
Constant 1.824 0.173 10.572 Constant -3.612 1.038 -3.479
Other Family-Rural Non-Family, Urban
African 5.763 1.008 5.717 African 0.332 0.372 0.891
Coloured 4.344 1.032 4.210 Coloured 0.975 0.358 2.723
Indian 2.502 1.246 2.009 Indian -1.181 1.037 -1.139
Pcntinc -0.007 0.008 -0.917 Pcntinc 0.006 0.001 5.465
Narrow 1.030 0.130 7.929 Narrow -0.488 0.369 -1.323
Broad 1.253 0.116 10.784 Broad -0.741 0.393 -1.886
Age -0.120 0.007 -17.782 Age -0.084 0.018 -4.755
Education -0.060 0.015 -4.138 Education 0.007 0.039 0.187
Constant -4.283 1.032 -4.150 Constant -1.805 0.825 -2.187
Other Family-Urban
African 1.858 0.224 8.307
Coloured 2.369 0.237 9.992
Indian 2.267 0.263 8.608 N 19527
Pcntinc 0.002 0.000 1.520 F (40, 2772) 538.77
Narrow 1.127 0.112 10.018 Prob>F 0.00
Broad 0.815 0.108 7.547
Age -0.084 0.006 -15.143
Education 0.069 0.012 5.535
Constant -2.110 0.303 -6.956
Note: The standard errors take account of the clustered nature of the sample.  Hausman tests were performed to test for the IIA
hypothesis and the results failed to reject the IIA hypothesis for most categories.
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Table 11: Predictions of Household Status, Females
Employed
All
Employed
White
Employed
African
Broad
Unemp
African
Narrow
Unemp
African
Head/Spouse 60.2% 57.9% 82.2% 46.1% 44.6%
Child 28.9% 30.2% 15.2% 37.6% 38.5%
Other Family-Rural 4.0% 5.0% 0.0% 8.2% 7.1%
Other Family-Urban 5.9% 5.8% 1.8% 7.6% 9.4%
NonFamily-Rural 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%
NonFamily-Urban 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.3% 0.3%
Note: Simulations based on results from Table 10.
Table 12: Unemployment and Poverty among Africans (1995)
Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic
Education Spline
    No education -786.6 112.3 -7.0
    Primary -145.9 86.8 -1.7
    Some Secondary 547.3 103.2 5.3
    Comp. Secondary 2022.7 279.0 7.2
    Some Tertiary 2614.1 497.8 5.3
Houshold Size -577.1 55.1 -10.5
Urban 3673.6 296.9 12.4
Number of Unemployed -1080.4 99.9 -10.8
Constant 9398.1 310.9 30.2
Note: The dependent variable is annual adult equivalent income of Africans in 1995.  The standard errors are adjusted to
take into account the clustered nature of the sample.  The education variables refer to the average education level of
everyone in the household who is older than 16. It is included as a spline which means that the effect of tertiary
education can be computed by adding the effects for none, primary, secondary, completed secondary, and tertiary.
Table 13: Unemployment, Participation, and Poverty (1995)
Households Ranked by Consumption Quintiles
All
quintiles
Quintile 1
(Poorest)
Quintile
2
Quintile
3
Quintile 4 Quintile 5
(Richest)
Broad Unemployment Rate 29.3 58.9 41.6 30.0 14.7 5.5
Narrow Unemployment Rate 16.5 35.8 25.9 19.0 8.8 3.4
Participation rate 54.3 42.4 48.8 55.8 61.0 69.5
Share Working 38.4 17.4 28.5 39.1 52.1 65.6
Share of people living in
households with no one working
25.6 50.5 30.9 17.4 11.1 8.1
Share of Broad Unemployed 37.4 27.2 21.2 10.5 3.8
Share of Narrow Unemployed 30.5 28.0 24.3 12.3 4.8
Source: Income and Expenditure Survey, CSS (1995).  The average adult equivalent monthly expenditure in the poorest two quintiles stood at about
$60 a month.
Table 14: Unemployed Persons and Household Structure, 1993 and 1997
Number of unemployed
0 1 2 3 4+ Total
1993 Amount 5931252 1722953 573793 193476 98981 8520455
Share 69.6 20.2 6.7 2.3 1.2 100
1997 Amount 5956836 2136267 776293 239112 148199 9256707
Share 64.3 23.1 8.4 2.6 1.6 100
     Increase Percentage 0.4% 24.0% 35.3% 23.6% 49.7% 8.6%
Source: Saldru (1993) and CSS (1997).
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Table 15: Predicting Labour Force Participation, Searching, and Employment (African and Coloureds)49
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Share of Adults in
Labour Force
Share Narrow/ Broad
LF*
Share Employed /
Narrow LF**
Remittance Amount -0.0008 (-13.8) -0.001 (-12.5) -0.0006  (-6.9)
Coloured 0.028    (1.9) 0.115   (6.9) 0.008     (0.5)
Urban 0.071    (6.2) 0.048   (3.6) -0.01    (-0.9)
Metropolitan 0.084    (6.8) 0.052   (3.8) -0.064   (-5.5)
Age 0.034    (10.7) -0.006   (-1.3) 0.0009    (0.2)
Age2 -0.0004 (-9.4) 0.0001 (1.9) -0.00004 (0.6)
Avg. Education 0.002    (1.6) 0.011  (6.0) 0.0083   (5.2)
Share Female -0.173   (-13.8) -0.049   (-2.7) 0.003     (0.2)
Pension Income -0.00025 (-9.8) -0.0005 (-14.8) -0.0003  (-8.7)
Private Income -0.0002  (-4.2) -0.0001 (-1.6) -0.0001  (-2.1)
Constant 0.93   (1.6) 0.86    (11.2) 0.81     (11.7)
R2 0.15 0.04 0.03
  * refers to the share of adults in a households in the broad labour force who are also in the narrow labour force (ie.
working or searching).  ** refers to the share of adults in a household in the narrow labour force who are employed.  t-
statistics in parentheses. Age refers to the average age of the adult members of the household.
Table 16: Determinants of Reservation Wages 1993
OLS Heckman Select
Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Ratio Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Ratio Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Ratio
Remittances -0.32 0.17 -1.87 -0.34 0.21 -1.58
Wage Income 0.14 0.07 2.11 0.15 0.04 3.30
Private Income 0.39 0.14 2.75 0.39 0.14 2.85
State Income -0.03 0.02 -1.91 -0.04 0.05 -0.76
Ag. Income -2.73 1.34 -2.03 -2.26 1.43 -1.58
Self-Emp. Inc. 0.66 0.20 3.32 0.62 0.14 4.57
old TBVC -51.07 99.23 -0.52 -10.28 48.89 -0.21 -0.01 0.06 -0.26
old SGT -87.04 63.13 -1.38 -81.53 37.10 -2.20 0.14 0.05 3.05
Coloured -165.76 53.12 -3.12 -179.63 48.73 -3.69 0.07 0.05 1.39
Indian 31.57 89.02 0.36 36.32 85.92 0.42 -0.07 0.09 -0.78
White 104.72 136.30 0.77 153.84 83.66 1.84 -0.37 0.06 -5.92
Everwork -48.60 33.87 -1.44 -47.71 30.61 -1.56
Female -209.26 30.47 -6.87 -205.69 28.86 -7.13 -0.08 0.03 -2.46
Age 23.20 7.96 2.92 23.33 9.13 2.56 0.02 0.01 2.27
Age Squared -0.26 0.11 -2.43 -0.23 0.12 -1.84 0.00 0.00 -3.08
Kids 85.01 39.66 2.14 91.10 36.40 2.50 -0.21 0.03 -6.22
Married 34.90 41.02 0.85 56.93 35.35 1.61 0.08 0.04 2.08
Education 31.48 6.07 5.19 33.31 4.72 7.06 -0.02 0.00 -3.46
Unemployment Rate 0.95 0.11 8.50
Urban 0.43 0.04 10.24
Constant 546.27 171.48 3.19 -1.88 0.21 -8.97
/athrho -0.30 0.10 -3.00 0.00 -0.50 -0.10
/lnsigma 6.33 0.03 212.68 0.00 6.28 6.39
Rho -0.29 0.09 -0.46 -0.10
Sigma 563.64 16.79 531.68 597.53
Lambda -165.32 55.86 -274.81 -55.83
R-Sq. 0.14
Likelihood Ratio Test (Pr rho=0) 0.0077
Source: In the OLS regression, the standard errors are adjusted to take into account the clustered sampling of the survey.
                                                          
49 Indians and Whites were dropped since the focus is on the groups with high unemployment rates.  Including them
would not change the results.
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Appendix
Table 1: Logit Prediction Relationship to Household Head and Migration Status, Males (1995)
Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Statistic Coefficient Standard
Error
T-Statistic
Headmove OtherFamilyMove-Urban
African -0.921 0.090 -10.223 African 1.423 0.501 2.837
Coloured -1.344 0.111 -12.145 Coloured 0.938 0.517 1.816
Indian -0.997 0.175 -5.700 Indian 1.273 0.499 2.553
Pcntinc 0.002 0.003 0.667 Pcntinc 0.026 0.007 3.548
Narrow -0.376 0.101 -3.707 Narrow 2.414 0.158 15.305
Broad -0.632 0.113 -5.605 Broad 1.705 0.207 8.235
Age 0.007 0.002 2.844 Age -0.109 0.009 -12.586
Education 0.045 0.008 5.661 Education 0.050 0.021 2.380
Constant 0.683 0.166 4.121 Constant -0.911 0.627 -1.452
Kidstay NonFamilyStay-Rural
African 0.788 0.142 5.531 African 2.963 2.337 1.268
Coloured 0.680 0.150 4.541 Coloured 1.805 2.258 0.799
Indian 0.635 0.188 3.371 Indian -26.857 1.831 -14.669
Pcntinc 0.025 0.007 3.629 Pcntinc 0.034 0.009 3.863
Narrow 2.186 0.095 22.974 Narrow -0.017 0.779 -0.022
Broad 2.306 0.099 23.380 Broad 0.593 0.616 0.962
Age -0.169 0.004 -39.271 Age -0.128 0.028 -4.520
Education 0.038 0.010 3.714 Education -0.204 0.087 -2.340
Constant 3.837 0.209 18.319 Constant -2.562 2.488 -1.030
Kidmove NonFamilyMove-Rural
African 0.386 0.343 1.124 African 1.524 0.962 1.583
Coloured 0.064 0.405 0.159 Coloured -0.420 1.266 -0.332
Indian 0.400 0.463 0.864 Indian 0.168 1.271 0.132
Pcntinc 0.023 0.007 3.321 Pcntinc 0.031 0.008 3.767
Narrow 2.023 0.250 8.086 Narrow 0.217 0.776 0.280
Broad 2.108 0.246 8.574 Broad 0.866 0.696 1.245
Age -0.193 0.014 -13.540 Age -0.119 0.031 -3.830
Education 0.028 0.027 1.028 Education -0.169 0.050 -3.381
Constant 1.768 0.510 3.469 Constant -1.870 1.409 -1.327
OtherFamilyStay-Rural NonFamilyStay-Urban
African 4.339 0.988 4.394 African 0.778 1.018 0.764
Coloured 2.807 1.023 2.744 Coloured 1.726 0.907 1.903
Indian 2.805 1.191 2.356 Indian -0.232 1.013 -0.229
Pcntinc 0.004 0.010 0.409 Pcntinc 0.028 0.007 4.066
Narrow 2.127 0.168 12.674 Narrow 1.504 0.508 2.959
Broad 2.377 0.149 15.955 Broad 0.739 0.559 1.321
Age -0.172 0.011 -16.391 Age -0.112 0.028 -4.054
Education -0.083 0.020 -4.095 Education 0.075 0.051 1.475
Constant -1.294 1.033 -1.253 Constant -2.159 1.519 -1.421
OtherFamilyMove-Rural NonFamilyMove-Urban
African 3.746 0.938 3.993 African 0.439 0.634 0.692
Coloured 2.864 1.036 2.765 Coloured -0.874 0.513 -1.704
Indian 2.048 1.020 2.008 Indian -0.784 0.593 -1.322
Pcntinc 0.031 0.008 3.827 Pcntinc 0.027 0.008 3.251
Narrow 1.793 0.245 7.305 Narrow -0.279 0.745 -0.375
Broad 2.075 0.221 9.374 Broad -0.641 0.668 -0.959
Age -0.146 0.012 -11.854 Age -0.037 0.015 -2.398
Education -0.060 0.023 -2.676 Education -0.016 0.032 -0.519
Constant -2.159 0.971 -2.223 Constant -2.056 0.796 -2.584
OtherFamilyStay-Urban
African 1.717 0.408 4.208
Coloured 2.142 0.405 5.281 N 22988
Indian 1.578 0.432 3.655 F (88, 2912) 257.84
Pcntinc 0.025 0.007 3.588 Prob>F 0
Narrow 2.273 0.156 14.549
Broad 2.359 0.153 15.428
Age -0.128 0.008 -16.829
Education 0.083 0.016 5.076
Constant -0.756 0.489 -1.546
Note:The Hausman test for the IIA assumptions was passed in the majority of cases.
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Table 2: Predicting Household Structure, Males.
Employed
All
Employed
Africans
Broad Unemp.
Africans
Narrow Unemp.
Africans
HeadStay 26.2% 26.7% 18.2% 17.1%
HeadMove 38.9% 35.9% 13.7% 16.4%
ChildStay 24.4% 25.6% 48.7% 45.2%
ChildMove 0.9% 1.0% 1.5% 1.4%
OtherFamStay-Rural 1.6% 2.0% 4.1% 3.4%
OtherFamMove-Rural 0.9% 1.2% 2.1% 1.7%
OtherFamStay-Urban 3.1% 3.1% 7.1% 6.7%
OtherFamMove-Urban 2.2% 2.6% 3.8% 7.0%
NonFamStay-Rural 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
NonFamMove-Rural 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
NonFamStay-Urban 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4%
NonFamMove-Urban 1.0% 1.3% 0.4% 0.5%
Note: Simulations are based on regression in Appendix Table 1.  Results for females are available on request.
Table 3: Changes in Household Formation and Employment Status among Africans in
KwaZulu-Natal, 1993 to 1998 (%)
Remain
Employed
Become
Employed
Remain
Unemployed
Become
Unemployed
Remain
Inactive
Become
Incative
Remain Head/Spouse 11.1 10.2 1.7 10.2 26.7 30.8
Become Head/Spouse 50.1 15.3 5.2 9.9 9.8 17.8
Remain Child 26.7 44.8 62.6 46.6 29.7 26.4
Become Child 0.9 1.7 2.0 1.1 1.8 0.7
Remain with Other Family 7.5 17.2 16.5 22.3 19.2 14.4
Go to Other Family 3.4 10.6 12.1 9.3 12.1 9.3
Remain with Non-Family 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.7
Go to Non-Family 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Cases 585 587 406 668 705 292
